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Rape shield laws are a critical aspect of the protection of rape complainants 
during the criminal justice process. The rationale of rape shield laws is 
to protect complainants from having their sexual reputation or behaviour 
used to reduce their credibility, particularly as the inferences drawn are 
based on historical prejudices against women, and do not actually assist 
with the fact-finding role of the court. This article will argue that Section 
227 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 aims to finding the correct 
balance between the protection of the complainant’s rights to privacy and 
dignity, while upholding an accused’s right to a fair trial, including the right 
to adduce and challenge evidence. However, the sparse case law related to 
section 227 raises questions about its successful implementation by courts.
1 Introduction
The evidence that a rape accused may lead in his own defence – 
particularly as it pertains to the character and conduct of his accuser 
– has been a matter of fierce debate over the past decades. Prior to 
the enactment in 1989 of section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
(‘section 227’), there was no ‘rape shield’ available to protect rape 
complainants and evidentiary rules were governed by the common 
law.1 The statutory enactment of the rape shield law in the Criminal 
Procedure Act has since faced amendment by the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act (‘SORMA’)2 
in order to bring it more in line with South Africa’s constitutional 
dispensation. The primary purpose of its enactment is to prevent 
irrelevant information from being admitted as evidence.3 A further 
rationale, albeit an ancillary one, is to protect a complainant in a 
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sexual offence matter from secondary victimisation during the trial as 
far as possible,4 by restricting the type of evidence that is admissible 
and the circumstances under which such evidence can be found to be 
admissible.
There has been no challenge to the constitutionality of section 
227 before a court yet, but the importance of the fair trial rights of 
an accused means that section 227 may always have the potential 
to be constitutionally challenged in so far as section 227 restricts 
the evidence which can be raised in defence of an accused. More 
importantly, the sparse case law in relation to section 227 in the high 
court raises questions about the efficacy of section 227’s use in the 
magistrates’ courts where the bulk of sexual offence cases are heard 
but the judgments are unreported. The absence of reported judgments 
cannot lead to the assumption that section 227 is being properly 
implemented,5 however, the efficacy of implementation of section 227 
in the magistrates’ courts is beyond the scope of this article but is an 
area that requires more research.
In this article it will be argued that there is no infringement of an 
accused’s right to a fair trial because prior sexual history evidence will 
generally be irrelevant and therefore not protected under the right 
to adduce and challenge evidence as contained in section 35(3)(i) of 
the Constitution.6 This author will begin by setting out the purpose 
of rape shield laws in order to understand their legitimate role in 
our law and the continued need for a rape shield. This author will 
interpret the scope of the right to challenge and adduce evidence to 
show that limiting the inclusion of prior sexual history evidence does 
not unconstitutionally infringe an accused’s fair trial rights. Besides 
making the argument that section 227 does not generally infringe 
the right to a fair trial, this author will also consider individual sub-
provisions of section 227 for potentially problematic implications.7
2 The purpose of rape shield laws
It is impossible to engage with the constitutionality of section 227 
without first discussing the rationale behind rape shield laws in 
4 D Haxton ‘Rape shield statutes: Constitutional despite unconstitutional exclusions 
of evidence’ (1985) 5 Wisconsin LR 1219 at 1220. 
5 Case law that does exist shows that section 227 remains inconsistently applied, see 
S v Katoo 2005 (1) SACR 522 (SCA).
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
7 The author uses gender-specific language in this article. The reason for this is two-
fold. Firstly, for ease of writing, and secondly, and more importantly, under the 
common law definition of rape, only women could be raped, and at present the 
majority of reported sexual offence complainants remain women. That does not 
discount the fact that men can be raped and are victims of sexual offences.
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general. The myths relating to rape and gender are inextricably bound 
within the legal system.8 This is evidenced from the way laws are 
drafted, and more poignantly, by the way they are implemented by 
judicial officers.9 Research has shown that there is a relation between 
the acceptance of rape myths and other forms of prejudice, such as 
sexism, racism and religious intolerance, and that all these constructs 
are connected as part of a unitary belief system.10 Stereotypical beliefs 
about victims can affect the judgment of those involved in decision-
making at different stages of the criminal justice process.11 Rape myths 
are prejudicial, and people who believe rape myths are more likely to 
attribute blame to the victim, holding that she could have avoided the 
incident by modifying her own behaviour.12
Even where rape shield laws do exist, they are not always properly 
implemented or are ignored.13 Even after the 2007 amendment of 
section 227, case law in South Africa suggests that section 227 is not 
properly implemented.14 The nature of sexual offences is such that 
they often occur in private. When the word of one person is set against 
the other, there may not always be sufficient evidence to point to 
a clear verdict. Other factors, such as credibility, will then become 
more important in determining the truth – and character evidence 
8 MJ Anderson ‘Understanding rape shield laws’ Violence Against Women Net 
(2004), available at www.Vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/rapeShield.pdf, accessed 
on 20 October 2010 at 1. Anderson argues that the law of rape has historically 
encouraged moral judgement of women who are or have been sexually active. This 
rests on the premise that an unchaste woman is unlikely to have been a victim of 
rape. 
9 S Moreland ‘Talking about rape - and why it matters: Adjudicating rape in the 
Western Cape High Court’ (2014) 47 SA Crime Q 5 at 7. 
10 AK Clarke and KL Lawson ‘Women’s judgments of a sexual assault scenario: The 
role of prejudicial attitudes and victim weight’ (2009) 24 Violence and Victims 248 
at 250.
11 J Temkin and B Krahe Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude 
(2009) 31. M O’Sullivan and C Murray ‘Brooms sweeping oceans? Women’s rights in 
South Africa’s first decade of democracy’ 2005 Acta Jur 32.
12 Clarke and Lawson op cit (n10) 249. Women who are raped are often believed 
to have deserved it or asked for it. K Wood, H Lambert and R Jewkes ‘“Showing 
roughness in a beautiful way”: Talk about love, coercion and rape in South African 
youth sexual culture’ (2007) 21 Medical Anthrop Q 277. H Moffett ‘“These women, 
they force us to rape them”: Rape as a narrative of social control in post-apartheid 
South Africa’ (2006) 32 J Sthn Afr Studs 129 at 138. 
13 Department of Women (NSW) Heroines of Fortitude: The Experiences of Women in 
Court as Victims of Sexual Assault and the Crimes (Rape) Act (1996) 223.
14 S v M 2002 (2) SACR 411 (SCA); S v Katoo supra (n5); S v Rapogadie (36/2010) [2012] 
ZAWCHC 15 (24 February 2012). In S v Mkhize 2012 (2) SACR 90 (KZD), while the 
court correctly applied the factors in section 227 and excluded evidence of prior 
sexual history, the court nonetheless considered separately the ‘relevance’ of the 
evidence.
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can be the deciding factor of a decision as to credibility.15 The danger 
is that lifestyle choices are attributed to whether there was consent 
in a particular case or not.16 Unfortunately, once character and prior 
sexual history evidence is admitted, there is very little that can be 
done to prevent negative inferences being drawn from it. Rape shield 
laws are intended to militate against the inference that a non-virginal 
woman is a promiscuous woman, what Anderson calls the chastity 
requirement.17 When evidence of prior sexual history is admitted, 
collateral issues may become the central focus of the trial and there 
is the danger of misuse of the evidence.18 Rape shield laws thus seek 
to prevent the prior sexual history being admitted as evidence at all 
unless there is a valid reason for its inclusion. At its essence then, rape 
shield laws endeavour to protect the truth-seeking process itself.19 
Moreover, it is argued that cross-examination of a sexual offence 
complainant, besides increasing the traumatisation and humiliation of 
the victim, does not elicit any relevant evidence.20 At most it establishes 
a propensity to have sexual intercourse.21 There is no reason why this 
15 For example, under the English Law of evidence (which was adopted in South 
Africa), prior sexual history evidence was used to show that a woman who had a 
sexual past outside of marriage was indecent. This then plays a role in the perceived 
credibility of the complainant. This tradition continued in South Africa where 
evidence of a rape complainant’s previous acts of chastity were considered relevant 
to consent. JRL Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure 2ed (1982) 450.
16 S v Rapogadie supra (n14). MS Raeder ‘Litigating sex crimes in the United States: 
Has the last decade made any difference?’ (2009) 6 International Commentary on 
Evidence 1 at 12. In sexual offence cases, particularly those in which consent is 
in dispute, the role that defence attorneys take on is to divert attention from the 
alleged offence in question and attempt to show that the complainant had provoked 
the sexual acts by the way she was dressed, where she was or how promiscuous she 
has been in the past, inferring that she was contributorily negligent. Raeder op cit 
(n16) 12.
17 Anderson op cit (n8).
18 SJ Odgers ‘Evidence of sexual history in sexual offence trials’ (1986–1988) 11 Syd LR 
73 at 76. 
19 MJ Anderson ‘From chastity requirement to sexuality licence: Sexual consent and a 
new rape shield law’ (2002) 70 George Wash LR 51 at 104.
20 South African Law Commission (Project 45) op cit (n3). PJ Schwikkard ‘The evidence 
of sexual complainants and the demise of the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act’ (2009) 
1 Namibia LJ 1 at 22. 
21 D Smythe, B Pithey and L Artz Sexual Offences Commentary Act 32 of 2007 
(2011) 23-12. Odgers op cit (n18) 81. It is unfounded that a woman’s reputation 
for a propensity to consent can show that she will consistently consent to sexual 
intercourse with other persons in other situations.
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evidence ought to be admitted as relevant in sexual offences, since 
propensity evidence in other cases is considered inadmissible.22
Although objection may be taken to it,23 rape shield laws are 
also aimed at limiting the discretion of judicial officers. Unfettered 
discretion allowed to presiding officers can be dangerous in an area 
of the law where intuitions and social prejudices are biased against 
women and critical of their sexual autonomy.24 Further, it is clear from 
case law that judges often do not properly exercise discretion to reject 
irrelevant character evidence of the complainant.25
Another purpose of rape shield laws is to protect sexual offence 
victims from the degradation of having to disclose intimate and 
embarrassing details about their private lives.26 This secondary 
trauma, while real and severe, is not the legal purpose of rape shield 
laws.27 The legal purpose is to prevent decisions being based on 
unfair, prejudicial and often irrelevant evidence of a complainant’s 
sexual history.28 This is consistent with the general rules of the law of 
evidence.29 The legislative objectives behind rape shield laws are also 
aimed at a number of social rationales. One of these is to protect sexual 
offence victims from victimisation under the legal process as the court 
experience for a complainant is often intimidating, humiliating and 
22 P-J Schwikkard ‘Getting somewhere slowly – the revision of a few evidence rules’ 
In L Artz and D Smythe Should We Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa 
(2008) 95; P-J Schwikkard ‘A critical overview of the rules of evidence relevant to 
rape trials in South African law’ In S Jagwanath, P-J Schwikkard and B Grant (eds) 
Women and the Law (1994) 204.
23 The independence and integrity of the judiciary is one of the primary reasons for 
maintaining unfettered discretion of judicial officers. However, judicial objectivity 
is not absolute. L du Plessis An Introduction to Law 3ed (1995) 91.
24 Anderson op cit (n8) 96; J Temkin ‘Regulating sexual history evidence – the limits 
of discretionary legislation’ (1984) 38 Int’l Comp LQ 942 at 964. Another objective 
is to change attitudes to sexual offences; much of the history of prejudice against 
women is carried over from the common law cautionary rule and the perception 
of women as less believable. Hon, Neville Wran, Premier of NSW, HSW Hansard, 
Legislative Assembly, 18 March 1981 at 4758, as quoted in Heroines of Fortitude 
op cit (n13) 223. Even in recent cases, there is a tendency of presiding officers to 
look for ‘corroborative’ evidence and not rely on the complainant’s version. This is 
illustrated in the case of S v Koopman (SS05/2011) [2012] ZAWCHC 109 (16 February 
2012).
25 S v Balhuber 1987 (1) PH H22 (A); S v N 1988 (3) SA 450 (A); S v M supra (n14); 
S v Rapogadie supra (n14); S v Katoo supra (n5).
26 J McDonough ‘Consent v credibility: The complications of evidentiary purpose rape 
shield statutes’ (2006) Law and Soc’y J at UCSB 1; C van der Bijl and PNS Rumney 
‘Attitudes, rape and law reform in South Africa’ (2009) 73 J Crim L 414 at 418.
27 Anderson op cit (n19) 104. 
28 Anderson op cit (n19) 110.
29 In Stevens v S [2005] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) at para [1], the court said that ‘care should 
be taken to ensure that evidentiary rules and procedural safeguards are properly 
applied and adhered to’.
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degrading. Rape shield laws also promote the administration of justice 
by ensuring that the complainant’s constitutional rights to dignity 
and privacy are properly respected,30 and to prevent a complainant 
from becoming so distraught that she is unable to give effective 
testimony.31 In the case of S v Mothopeng,32 it was held that it is for the 
proper administration of justice that witnesses should not feel fear of 
retribution if choosing to testify.
Related to mitigating secondary victimisation is to increase the 
reporting of sexual offences.33 In the case of S v Staggie,34 it was held 
that greater assistance ought to be provided for women who report 
sexual offences, as this would encourage more women to report 
sexual offences and become witnesses in these proceedings if they 
saw that they would be protected from wide-scale humiliation and 
embarrassment.35 There are many reasons why women choose not to 
report sexual crimes, for example, lack of confidence in the police, 
confusion as to whether the sexual encounter actually constitutes 
an offence, fear of the perpetrator, to name but a few. But at least 
some women fail to report because of fear of having their past sexual 
experiences being brought to light in court.36
‘So what if a woman might have had sex with 60 men, 4 times a night for the 
past five years, what’s that got to do with whether she consented to these 
three accused on this night …?’37
This is precisely the purpose of section 227, to reduce the kind of 
inferential reasoning that a woman is likely to have consented because 
of sexual activity in her past. The prejudice that rape can be justified38 
is perpetuated by these inferences and is what section 227 seeks to 
prevent. The purposes of rape shield laws are numerous and important 
in nature. Whether these rationales are justifiable in light of the 
accused’s right to adduce and challenge evidence will be investigated 
in section 4 of this article.
30 In S v M 1999 (1) SACR 664 (C) at 673h-j, the court emphasised the importance of 
the complainant’s right to dignity in a sexual offence matter and stated that ‘the 
protection of the dignity of a rape victim raises an area of reasonable and justifiable 
limit to an accused’s right of silence’. 
31 D Smythe ‘Moving beyond 30 years of Anglo-American rape law reforms: Legal 
representation for victims of sexual offences’ (2005) 18 SACJ 167 at 183. 
32 1979 (2) SA 180 (T). 
33 Raeder op cit (n16) at 12. 
34 2003 (1) BCLR 43 (C) at 44.
35 Ibid.
36 CL Kello ‘Rape shield laws – Is it time for reinforcement?’ (1987–1988) 21 U Mich J 
LRef 317 at 327.
37 Heroines of Fortitude op cit (n13) 266.
38 MJ Anderson ‘Rape in South Africa’ (1999–2000) 1 Georgetown J Gender & the Law 
789 at 811. 
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3 Section 227
The first rape shield statute was passed in Michigan, United States of 
America, in 1974.39 South Africa saw enactment of its first rape shield 
law in 1989. Prior to enactment, there was no rape shield available 
to protect sexual offence complainants and evidentiary rules were 
governed by the common law. It was admitted by the South African 
Law Commission that the common law position was a relic from an era 
when it was generally accepted as truth that ‘no decent woman had 
sexual intercourse outside marriage’.40 The general rules of evidence 
in relation to relevance were insufficient to deal with these social 
prejudices.41 In fact, the Appellate Division admits this in the case of 
R v Matthews where it stated that ‘relevancy is based on a blend of logic 
and experience lying outside the law’.42 Thus, on the recommendations 
of the South African Law Commission, section 227 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act was enacted in 1989 so that evidence relating to the 
sexual conduct of the complainant outside of the conduct complained 
of became inadmissible, as well as making cross-examination of such 
matters impermissible.43
The most recent amendment of section 227 came into effect through 
the process of discussion and recommendations by a more recent South 
African Law Commission project.44 Because the 1989 amendment still 
left open very wide discretion to judicial officers, in 2002 the Law 
Commission was persuaded by pressure from academics as well as the 
lobbying efforts of women’s groups,45 that further amendments were 
necessary.46 The amendment to section 227 was brought to legislative 
life in SORMA.47
4 The challenges to section 227
The potential constitutional challenge to section 227 in general is 
that by restricting the kind of evidence that is allowed to be admitted 
39 Michigan Penal Code Act 328 of 1931; amended 1974: s 750.520j. Anderson op cit 
(n8) 81.
40 SA Law Commission op cit (n3).
41 T Ilsey ‘Sexual history evidence in South Africa: A comparative enquiry’ (2002) 15 
SACJ 225 at 239.
42 R v Matthews 1960 (1) SA 752 (A) at 758 A-B.
43 E du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Revision service 44) 
(2010) 2, 24-100B.
44 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 102 (Project 107) ‘Sexual Offences: 
Process and Procedure’ (2001) Chapter 32.
45 Inter alia, Rape Crisis, the Women’s Legal Centre.
46 Schwikkard in Artz and Smythe op cit (n22) 95.
47 Relevant portions of section 227 will be quoted in section 4 of this article.
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into evidence or restricting the line of questioning that is allowed, 
the accused’s rights to adduce and challenge evidence are infringed. 
Section 35(3) of the Constitution entrenches the right of every accused 
person to a fair trial. For current purposes, the most relevant component 
is 35(3)(i), which embeds the right to adduce and challenge evidence:
‘(3) Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the 
right –
(i) to adduce and challenge evidence.’
On first appearance section 227 does to some extent limit the right to 
adduce and challenge evidence. Whether there is in fact a justifiable 
limitation of the right or not, can only be determined by interpreting 
section 35(3)(i) with regard to its scope.48 Certain individual aspects of 
section 227 have also been criticised for their potential constraint on 
judicial discretion49 and the arguable over-reaching of subsection (5) 
and its conflict with subsection (6).
4.1 Interpreting section 35(3)(i)
In relation to section 39(1) of the Constitution the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights can be understood by means of four principles, namely, 
looking to the actual ‘text’, using a ‘purposive interpretation’, which is 
both ‘generous’ towards the right itself and cognisant of the ‘context’.50 
The starting point for interpreting a provision of the Bill of Rights is 
the language of the text itself. In the Constitutional Court judgment 
S Zuma,51 the Court said:
‘While we must always be conscious of the values underlying the Constitution, 
it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written instrument. The Constitution 
does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean … the language … must 
be respected.’52
In the case of section 35(3)(i) the language used is very concise and 
unspecific. Included in the broad right of an accused’s right to a ‘fair 
trial’ is the right to ‘adduce’ and ‘challenge’ evidence.53 The golden 
rule of interpretation is to look to the ‘plain words’ used and to give 
48 Questions regarding how much infringement is required before it can be said 
that the right to adduce and challenge evidence is sufficiently adversely affected 
to require a limitations analysis under section 36 of the Constitution are raised. 
S Woolman and M Bishop Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (Revision service 
6) (2014) 51-165.
49 Op cit (n28).
50 I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) 136.
51 S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC).
52 S v Zuma supra (n51) at para [17].
53 Section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. 
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them their ordinary meaning.54 Applying the golden rule to ‘the right 
to adduce and challenge evidence’, the right includes both the capacity 
to introduce new evidence before the court and to test evidence that 
has been presented. The literal meaning of the text does not provide 
a clear indication of its denotation nor indicate the extent of the right.
The literal meaning of the text in isolation is not always sufficient 
to understand the true scope of a constitutional provision. Even where 
the literal meaning appears self-evident, other interpretive tools ought 
also to be employed to give a proper interpretation to a provision.55 
The Court in S v Makwanyane summarised the approach to the proper 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights:
‘Whilst paying due regard to the language that has been used, [an 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights should be] “generous” and “purposive” 
and “give … expression to the underlying values of the Constitution”.’56
Aligning the two seemingly contradictory approaches by the 
Constitutional Court in Zuma and in Makwanyane, Currie and de Waal 
suggest that a reconciled approach is to accept the literal meaning of 
the text if it accords with a generous and purposive interpretation that 
takes due account of the underlying values of the Constitution. It is 
clear that the purpose of section 35(3)(i) is to constitutionally entrench 
the accused’s rights to a fair trial. What is not clear is whether the 
purpose is to extend the rights beyond their meaning at common law. 
The ‘right to adduce and challenge evidence’ is ambiguous and does 
not give any indication of the scope or limitation of the right. On face 
value, it appears that the right extends to adducing and challenging all 
evidence. It is therefore necessary to apply a purposive approach to 
determine the scope of the right.
‘Purposive interpretation is aimed at understanding the core values that 
underpin the listed fundamental rights in an open and democratic society, 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and then to prefer an 
interpretation of the provision in question which best complies with those 
values.’57
Once the purpose of the right has been identified, it is possible to then 
determine the scope of the right.58 Purposive interpretation recognises 
that the interpretation of the Bill of Rights involves a value judgment, 
but does not prescribe how the value judgment is to be made, as well 
54 L du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 103.
55 Currie and de Waal op cit (n50) 136.
56 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para [9].
57 Currie and de Waal op cit (n50) 136.
58 Currie and de Waal op cit (n50) 137.
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as emphasising that this value judgment should not be construed as 
the importation of public opinion.59
This author will consider the right to introduce new evidence and 
the right to challenge evidence separately as the objects of these two 
elements are clearly distinguishable. The law of evidence is governed 
by the common law and by statute, both of which include evidentiary 
rules that limit the kind of evidence that an accused may adduce 
or challenge.60 The general rule of the law of evidence is that only 
evidence that is relevant is admissible.61 There is no reason to believe 
that by including the right to adduce evidence in the Constitution, 
the drafters intended to endow the accused with the right to adduce 
irrelevant evidence. Therefore, arguably, on a purposive interpretation, 
the general common law rule with regard to relevance remains. The 
only difference is that the right has constitutional protection. The 
scope of the right to adduce evidence thus extends only as far as 
relevant evidence.
In the case of S v Shabalala,62 it was said that if the weight of 
evidence ‘is so inconsequential and the relevance accordingly so 
problematical, there can be little point in receiving the evidence’.63 
Ordinarily, evidence regarding a complainant’s prior sexual history 
will not assist the court in reaching a decision on the actual issues 
in dispute,64 and is therefore irrelevant and inadmissible. The right 
in section 35(3)(i) cannot be read as extending the accused’s right to 
adduce evidence to allowing irrelevant prior sexual history evidence. 
Such an interpretation is in accordance with the underlying values of 
the Constitution, in particular human dignity. The Constitution clearly 
protects the right of the accused to a fair trial, but if this extended to 
allowing irrelevant evidence, of which the prejudice to the complainant 
outweighed its probative value, the complainant’s right to dignity and 
privacy would be infringed.65
59 Currie and de Waal op cit (n50) 137.
60 Hearsay evidence is a good example of this, and is governed by section 3 of the Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act of 1988.
61 Section 210 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
62 S v Shabalala 1986 (4) SA 734 (A).
63 S v Shabalala supra (n62) at 743F.
64 Personal beliefs can inform whether evidence is considered relevant or not. In the 
leading Canadian case of R v Seaboyer (1991) 2 S.C.R. 577, 83 DLR (4th) 193 at 228, 
the Court stated that ‘the content of any relevancy decision will be filled by the 
particular judge’s experience, common sense and/or logic … There are certain areas 
of enquiry where experience, common sense and logic are informed by stereotype 
and myth … This area of the law [the admissibility of sexual history evidence] 
has been particularly prone to the utilisation of stereotype in determination of 
relevance’. 
65 Ilsley op cit (n 41).
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A further question in dispute is how the right to challenge evidence 
aligns itself with the right to cross-examine. Cross-examination is 
an essential part of an adversarial system, and is the stage at which 
the defence’s version should be introduced.66 The court has no right 
to prevent cross-examination, even where the purpose is to protect 
the witness.67 The right to adduce and challenge evidence includes 
the right to confront one’s accuser and to cross-examine them.68 
The purpose of cross-examination is to elicit favourable facts to the 
cross-examiner’s case and to challenge the accuracy of the witness’s 
version.69 ‘The scope of cross-examination is wider than examination-
in-chief. The cross-examiner is also not restricted to matters covered 
by the witness in his evidence-in-chief’.70 However, there are limits 
to what may be cross-examined.71 The court retains the discretion to 
disallow questioning which is ‘irrelevant, unduly repetitive, oppressive 
or otherwise improper’.72 ‘Inadmissible evidence may not be put to 
or elicited from a witness’, and where such evidence is elicited, this 
evidence does not become admissible.73
As with adducing evidence, there seems to be no reason to believe 
that the constitutional entrenchment of the right to challenge evidence 
has become sufficiently wide to allow the eliciting of inadmissible 
evidence during cross-examination. Thus, the scope of the right to 
adduce and challenge evidence does not extend to adducing and 
eliciting inadmissible evidence. This author would argue that when 
the defence questions a complainant about her prior sexual history, 
without prior or subsequent evidence being tendered in that regard, 
there is no evidence that is being challenged. In fact, new evidence is 
being elicited, without allowing the opportunity for the other side to 
challenge this evidence. This is a circumventing of the general rules 
related to the admission of evidence. Thus, cross-examination that 
seeks to elicit new evidence regarding the complainant’s prior sexual 
history does not fall under the protection of ‘challenging evidence’ as 
contained in section 35(3)(i).
66 P-J Schwikkard and SE van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3ed (2009) 366.
67 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit (n66) 366.
68 MH Cheadle, DM Davis and NRL Haysom South African Constitutional Law: Bill of 
Rights 2ed (2005) 29–37.
69 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit (n66) 366.
70 Ibid.
71 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom op cit (n68) 29–37.
72 Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO 1996 (3) BCLR 402 (SE) at 410A-B.
73 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit (n66) 368.
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4.2 Individual provisions of section 227
4.2.1 Subsection (1)
‘(1) Evidence as to the character of the accused or as to the character of any 
person against or in connection with whom a sexual offence as contemplated 
in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 
2007, is alleged to have been committed, shall, subject to the provisions of 
subsection (2), be admissible or inadmissible if such evidence would have 
been admissible or inadmissible on the 30th day of May, 1961.’
Section 227(1), for all intents and purposes, maintains the approach 
to character evidence as was the position at common law. This means 
that the primary test for character evidence is relevance.
There are two categories of character evidence, namely, evidence of 
general reputation and evidence of a general disposition to think or act 
in a particular way.74 The law of evidence does not place an emphasis 
on the importance of evidence of general reputation, however, under 
South African law, disposition evidence is often considered relevant 
because it may be an indicator of future conduct.75 Precisely because 
of this, disposition evidence can be dangerous because of the prejudice 
that would arise from relying on past behaviour to determine the 
accuracy of the claim before the court at present. There are strict 
rules relating to the admission of similar fact evidence, but where its 
only purpose is connected to character or propensity reasoning, the 
evidence ought to be excluded.76
The general rule is that a complainant can be cross-examined in 
order to expose her credibility, or lack thereof. However, evidence 
as to character or the general disposition of the complainant was not 
considered relevant to credibility.77 An exception to this rule was 
that when the matter related to a sexual offence, evidence as to the 
complainant’s bad reputation for lack of chastity was allowed to be 
adduced.78 The admissibility of bad reputation for lack of chastity has 
been removed from our law by the enactment of section 227 in 1989 
as well as its latest amendment in 2007. Evidence related to lack of 
chastity would be included in ‘prior sexual experience or conduct’ 
as contemplated in section 227(2). The problem is that section 227 
does not define what kind of character evidence is admissible or not 
admissible. The only indication of limitation are the words ‘subject to 
the provisions of subsection (2)’. This means that character evidence 
related to or stemming from a complainant’s prior sexual history 
74 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit (n66) 59.
75 Ibid.
76 R v Matthews 1960 (1) SA 752 (A).
77 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit (n66) 65.
78 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit (n66) 65-66.
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would be inadmissible unless a court specifically allowed it after 
application was made under section 227.79 For example, evidence that 
a complainant consented to every offer of sexual intercourse ever 
made to her would not be admissible under subsection (1) because it 
elicits prior sexual history evidence. Application to have this evidence 
admitted would have to be made under subsection (2).
There are other matters of character that were admissible in the past, 
that are still admitted now, such as the appearance of the complainant.80 
The problem is that certain kinds of character evidence are admitted 
because it is considered ‘normal’ to admit them.81 This is dangerous, 
because these are not properly admitted as character evidence but 
inferences as to a complainant’s character and promiscuity are made.82 
An example is questioning the complainant about why she was out 
alone at night, or why she was at a bar in a bad part of town.83 The 
amount of makeup a woman was wearing at the time of the incident 
is an issue that has been raised by the defence in showing that the 
accused’s belief that there was consent was reasonable.84 The purpose 
of distorting the image of the complainant is to create the impression 
that the complainant was dressed provocatively and therefore partly at 
fault for the incident.85 Instead of focusing on the sexual character of 
the accused, the character of the complainant is focused on, cloaking 
the true issue at stake in the trial: the guilt of the accused.
This kind of evidence may be admitted without a problem, as it is 
not properly understood by presiding officers as character evidence.86 
Attorneys are therefore able to allow inferences to be made, just by 
how a sexual offence complainant was dressed. This kind of evidence 
is considered not to be important enough to require application to the 
court to have it admitted. However, whether consciously or not, it is 
accepted that ‘appearances have meanings’,87 and are crucial in how 
79 In R v Matthews supra (n76), the court relying on the 1923 case of R v Julius 1923 CPD 
118 stated that ‘evidence of bad character may not even be suggested indirectly’.
80 S v Zuma supra (n51).
81 V Bronstein ‘The rape complainant in court: An analysis of legal discourse’ (1994) 
Acta Jur 217.
82 In S v Balhuber supra (n25), the complainant is asked about her illegitimate child, 
and also if she had previously seen a man naked. Bronstein op cit (n81) 213 and 216.
83 In the court transcript from S v Balhuber, the complainant is asked by the defence 
attorney: ‘Now you have got around Hillbrow walking around in the early hours of 
the morning?’ Extract quoted in Bronstein op cit (n81) 216.
84 C Shen ‘Study: From attribution and thought-process theory to rape shield laws: The 
meaning of victim’s appearance in rape trials’ (2003) 5 J Law Fam Studs 435 at 442.
85 S Lees Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (2002) 141.
86 Clarke and Lawson op cit (n10) 249. 
87 Shen op cit (n84) 435.
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people are judged, even during the criminal justice process.88 It is 
undeniable that the appearance of a witness or the accused at the trial 
can sway the presiding officer’s mind as to general credibility – our 
court etiquette requires being dressed neatly and formally. It is not 
inconceivable, therefore, that hearing an account of the complainant’s 
appearance at the time of the incident may hold similar strength in the 
mind of the presiding officer in reaching a decision. When clothing 
items of the victim are introduced as evidence in a rape trial, legal 
rules of evidence are drawn on, as well as cultural meanings of dress 
in determining its relevance.89 The intention of the complainant in 
dressing in a particular way is inferred from the kind of clothing 
worn.90
Many people believe that by a woman dressing provocatively in 
public, she is inviting an attack through her appearance.91 A woman 
is considered at least partially responsible for being raped if she was 
wearing revealing clothing.92 This means that the perpetrator is then 
judged as less morally and criminally blameworthy. Although evidence 
as to appearance might not seem as essential to prevent as evidence 
related to past sexual encounters, in practice its effect is substantial. 
For example, in the Zuma case,93 there was much reference made to the 
fact that the complainant was attired in a ‘kanga with no underwear’.94 
The accused’s daughter testified that the complainant was dressed 
inappropriately.95 The way the complainant was dressed, albeit not in 
isolation, was certainly a factor which the court took into account in 
determining that the complainant was not a credible witness in terms 
of truth-telling.
The consumption of alcohol is a common means of discrediting a 
rape complainant. With regard to women, alcohol carries the taint of 
immorality and promiscuity.96 A complainant’s alcohol consumption is 
used in two ways to discredit her. The first is to suggest that alcohol 
88 Lees op cit (n85) 133.
89 Shen op cit (n84) 436.
90 Shen op cit (n84) 444.
91 Shen op cit (n84) 436. D Vali and ND Rizzo ‘Apparel as one factor in sex crimes 
against young females: Professional opinions of US psychiatrists’ (1991) 35 Int J 
Offender Therapy & Comp Crim 167.
92 Temkin and Krahe op cit (n11) 33. BA Babcock et al Sex Discrimination and the 
Law: History, Practice, and Theory 2ed (1996) 1410. EM Edmonds and DD Cahoon 
‘Attitudes concerning crimes related to clothing worn by female victims’ (1986) 24 
Bull Psychonomic Soc’y 444.
93 [2006] 3 All SA (8) (W).
94 S v Zuma supra (n51) at 58. 
95 Ibid.
96 Lees op cit (n85) 145. Van der Bijl and Rumney op cit (n26) 422.
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unleashes a woman’s sexuality and lowers her inhibitions.97 The 
second is to imply that a woman under the influence of alcohol is 
more likely to act vindictively and lay a false charge.98 Both of these 
means suggest that it is likely that the complainant consented to the 
sexual advances of the accused, and that it was not unwelcome by the 
complainant at the time. 99
4.2.2 Subsection (5)
Subsection (5) reads as follows:
‘In determining whether evidence or questioning as contemplated in this 
section is relevant to the proceedings pending before the court, the court 
shall take into account whether such evidence or questioning –
(a) is in the interests of justice, with due regard to the accused’s right to a 
fair trial;
(b) is in the interests of society in encouraging the reporting of sexual 
offences;
(c) relates to a specific instance of sexual activity relevant to a fact in issue;
(d) is likely to rebut evidence previously adduced by the prosecution;
(e) is fundamental to the accused’s defence;
(f) is not substantially outweighed by its potential prejudice to the 
complainant’s personal dignity and right to privacy; or
(g) is likely to explain the presence of semen or the source of pregnancy or 
disease or any injury to the complainant, where it is relevant to a fact in 
issue.’
Section 227(5) instructs that when a court is determining whether prior 
sexual history evidence is relevant or not, the court ‘shall’ take the 
outlined factors into account. ‘Shall’ constitutes mandatory language, 
which means that a court must consider the factors that are outlined. 
Such an approach was criticised in the past for creating categories 
which would leave open situations which have not been foreseen, 
and therefore evade the recognised categories.100 However, the factors 
are extremely useful as they make mandatory the considerations that 
have to be considered in determining the relevance of the evidence or 
questioning.101
This justification leads to another potential criticism that can be 
levelled against subsection (5). That is, that it constrains judicial 
97 Lees op cit (n85) 145.
98 Lees op cit (n85) 146.
99 In S v Balhuber supra (n25), alcohol is used to try and discredit the complainant. 
The defence attorney states, ‘You were offered a lager with a glass – you just took 
the bottle. You continued dancing and drank it rather quickly.’ Bronstein op cit 
(n81) 211.
100 Du Toit et al op cit (n43) 24-100D.
101 Ibid.
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discretion in determining whether evidence is relevant or not,102 
particularly because it makes use of mandatory language. The factors 
as set out in section 227(5) do need to be considered by a court. 
However, there is nothing to suggest that it is a closed list. Guidelines do 
not displace judicial discretion, but rather guide it. The considerations 
listed are the types of factors a court ought to take into account in any 
event. The evidence apparent from case law is that presiding officers 
continue not to properly exercise their discretion in determining the 
relevance and admissibility of prior sexual history evidence.103
The Legislature chose to adopt an approach that did not entirely 
prohibit prior sexual history evidence, since this could have the effect 
of eliminating relevant evidence that is necessary to the defence of 
an accused. Hence, it chose, on the one hand, to uphold the right 
to adduce and challenge evidence, and by extension, the accused’s 
right to a fair trial. On the other hand, it recognised the danger in 
leaving the determination of relevance entirely in the hands of judicial 
officers. A balanced approach is to set out a list of the circumstances 
in which prior sexual history evidence is admissible, while still leaving 
it to judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis. There is no substantial 
infringement of judicial discretion. The ultimate decision of the 
admissibility of evidence lies with the presiding officer. This is not 
an undue constraint or limitation on judicial discretion, and therefore 
does not raise any problems, constitutional or otherwise.
It is necessary to consider how these factors are meant to be read. 
Even if it is assumed that all the factors have to be considered, the rights 
of the accused will have to take precedence. The policy reasons behind 
encouraging reporting and minimising secondary victimisation of the 
complainant cannot be used to override the constitutionally enshrined 
right of an accused to a fair trial.104 On a correct reading of subsection 
(5), not all the factors need to be read together, only one factor need 
be fulfilled in a given case. As this author sees it, paragraphs (a), (c), 
(d), (e) and (g) are factors that pertain to the rights of the accused to 
adduce and challenge evidence, while paragraphs (b) and ( f ) contain 
considerations relevant to the complainant’s protection. The interests 
of society in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences (paragraph 
b) and the requirement that the admission of sexual history evidence 
should not be overly prejudicial to the complainant (paragraph f ), can 
be used to test the probative value of the evidence that is sought to be 
adduced against the accused’s fair trial rights.
102 Du Plessis op cit (n23) 91.
103 S v Balhuber supra (n25); S v N 1988 (3) SA 450 (A); S v M supra (n14); S v Rapogadie 
supra (n14); S v Katoo supra (n5).
104 Du Toit et al op cit (n43) 24-100E.
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In some cases it will be clear that the evidence is relevant. For 
example, where a complainant alleges that the accused raped her and 
she contracted HIV, it is logical that evidence that her usual sexual 
partner is HIV positive would be admissible to rebut such evidence, 
and it would be unnecessary to consider either paragraph (b) or (f) 
in reaching that decision. It depends on the scenario in each case 
individually. On this analysis, subsection (5) presents no potential 
constitutional challenges. By reading the list of factors as an open list 
which does not unduly restrict judicial discretion, and by allowing an 
understanding that each circumstance can be considered on its own, 
without having to consider all of them and pit the interests of the 
accused against the complainant in each and every case, it is apparent 
that subsection (5) would pass constitutional muster.
4.2.3 Subsection (6)
Subsection (6) contains the following provision:
‘The court shall not grant an application referred to in subsection 2(a) if, 
in its opinion, such evidence or questioning is sought to be adduced to 
support an inference that by reason of the sexual nature of the complainant’s 
experience or conduct, the complainant-
(a)  is more likely to have consented to the offence being tried; or
(b)  is less worthy of belief.’
On the plain meaning of this section, it is notable that the discretion 
available to the judicial officer only extends so far as to determine the 
purpose for which the evidence is sought to be tendered or questioned. 
Once such a purpose has been found to fall under section 227(6)(a) or 
(b), there is no discretion available to the judicial officer. He is forced 
to exclude the evidence. This has the effect of creating an exclusionary 
rule.105
It seems that the evidence is inadmissible because of the purpose 
for which the evidence or questioning is sought to be adduced, and 
does not consider how the court itself would use the evidence.106 
A court cannot therefore consider the probative value for any other 
permissible inference.107 However, it is difficult to think of a scenario 
in which some other inference, which did not fit under the listed 
factors in subsection (5), would otherwise be admissible were it not for 
subsection (6). Propensity reasoning is generally inadmissible,108 and 
105 Du Toit et al op cit (n43) 24-100E.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit (n66) 51. 
South Africa’s rape shield: Does section 227 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act affect an accused’s fair trial rights? 17
there seems no reason why it ought to be allowed in sexual offence 
cases.
In this author’s view the use of the word ‘support’ has the effect of 
widening the ambit of the apparent exclusionary rule.109 This means 
that even where the evidence or questioning would form part of a 
larger body of evidence which the court would consider together and 
not just where the evidence or questioning is sought to establish the 
inference, the evidence or questioning is excluded.110 Even where there 
may be a range of evidence to support the inference, the evidence 
or questioning regarding prior sexual history will be inadmissible. 
Exclusion of inferential evidence in the scenario explained above is 
logical and legally sound. If there are other pieces of relevant evidence 
available to point to an inference, then the court ought to make use 
of those without relying on otherwise inadmissible evidence to assist 
in making a judgment about the possibility of a complainant having 
consented or a complainant’s believability. Alternatively, if it is the 
only evidence available upon which an inference as to consent or 
believability can be drawn, then it should definitely be inadmissible, 
as its prejudice to the complainant manifestly outweighs its probative 
value. Section 227 was enacted in order to prevent these very inference-
based conclusions being drawn.
It has been argued that the use of the words ‘by reason of the 
sexual nature of the complainant’s sexual experience or conduct’ 
and not the words ‘by reasons only’ opens up an ambiguity.111 It is 
unclear whether the court ought to refuse to admit the evidence if it is 
adduced to support an inference that the complainant is more likely to 
have consented or less worthy of belief, by reason of the sexual nature 
of the offence, or some other aspect of the evidence that has nothing to 
do with the sexual nature.112 Is ‘by reason of’ sufficiently specific to 
allow the implied reading of ‘only’ into the section?113
Subsection (6) is substantially similar to section 276(1) of the Canadian 
Criminal Code. This section has been constitutionally challenged, and 
has withstood that challenge in the case of R v Darrach.114 The court 
in that case stated that:
‘The phrase “by reason of the sexual nature of the activity” in section 276 is 
a clarification by Parliament that it is inferences from the sexual nature of 
the activity, as opposed to inferences from other potentially relevant features 
of the activity, that are prohibited. If evidence of sexual activity is proffered 
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Du Toit op cit (n43) 24-100F.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, 2000 SCC 46.
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for its non-sexual features, such as to show a pattern of conduct or a prior 
consistent statement, it may be permitted.’115
Arguably, subsection (6) is capable of reading in the word ‘only’. 
However, the ambiguity outlined above is not necessarily the most 
problematic. Rather, the ambiguity that needs to be cleared up is 
whether this evidence can be adduced or questioned where it is to 
support the kind of inference prohibited, but is also for some other 
purpose. Therefore ‘only’ ought to be read-in in the following way: 
‘The court shall not grant an application referred to in subsection 
2(a) if, in its opinion, such evidence or questioning is sought to be 
adduced only to support an inference that by reason of the sexual 
nature of the complainant’s experience or conduct, the complainant’. 
This reading ensures that evidence that is sought to be adduced or 
cross-examined must be intended for some purpose other than mere 
propensity reasoning. Subsection (6), therefore, does not restrict 
subsection (5). Only where there is no purpose other than to show 
that the complainant is more likely to have consented or is less worthy 
of belief will the application be refused. This maintains the balance 
between the accused’s right to adduce and challenge evidence, while 
protecting the complainant from unfair and irrelevant evidence.
There is evidence to suggest that the courts will read subsection 
(6) in this way. In the Zuma case,116 the court allowed evidence of 
the complainant’s history of having (allegedly) falsely accused men of 
rape in the past. Although the 2007 amendment was not yet in force, 
Van der Westhuizen J did consider it, albeit not in-depth. The effect 
of the evidence would support an inference that the complainant was 
less worthy of belief. However, it was also perceived as necessary to 
the accused’s defence. Likewise, in S v Mkhize, the Court considered 
an application under section 227 and denied it on the basis that the 
evidence was for the purposes of supporting an inference that the 
complainant’s evidence of the rape was not believable.117 Therefore, 
it seems that where there is another reason besides the support of an 
inference as contemplated in subsection (6), the evidence sought to 
be adduced or questioned will not fall under the ‘exclusionary rule’.118 
There is some evidence to suggest that this approach was possible 
115 R v Darrach supra (n114) at 35.
116 S v Zuma supra (n51).
117 S v Mkhize supra (n14) at 95. 
118 On the other hand, it is argued that admitting evidence of prior false accusations 
of rape is often to the detriment of the complainant as the perception that false 
accusations are common is widely believed. BE Applegate ‘Prior (false?) accusations: 
Reforming rape shields to reflect the dynamics of sexual assault’ (2013) Lewis and 
Clark LR 889 at 900–901.
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pre-section 227,119 and there is no reason to read section 227 in any 
other way.
It has been suggested that subsection (6) was drafted because it 
was envisaged that it would render evidence inadmissible that is in 
fact relevant.120 On a correct understanding of the general purpose 
of section 227, it is possible to read the purpose of subsection (6) 
entirely differently. Section 227 was enacted largely because sexual 
offence complainants were treated differently by the court to other 
complainants in other criminal matters, in that evidence that was 
irrelevant was allowed to be adduced or at least open to cross-
examination.121 This trend comes from a long history of prejudice 
against the sexual autonomy of women.122 Section 227 was therefore 
enacted to ensure that a similar pattern was not maintained. Against this 
backdrop, subsection (6) serves to prevent propensity and inferential 
reasoning being used to sway the court against the complainant, 
where propensity and inference is the only purpose behind adducing 
such evidence. The presumption of innocence and the accused’s fair 
trial rights generally are not put in danger, since this kind of reasoning 
is ordinarily inadmissible in any event. If there is some other reason 
besides an inference being drawn, the court will consider that purpose 
under subsection (5) and it no longer falls under the ‘exclusionary rule’ 
arguably created under subsection (6).
Another criticism which could be levelled against this section, as 
well as subsection (2), is that in the situation where the accused and 
the complainant were involved in a relationship, either in the past 
or immediately preceding the alleged incident, evidence as to their 
sexual history is inadmissible without leave from the court. It could 
be argued that evidence of a past consensual sexual relationship is 
always relevant and admissible. There may be circumstances in which 
the evidence is relevant, including to explain the presence of semen on 
clothing or pregnancy. However, this is already an accepted exclusion 
119 In R v M 1970 (1) SA 323 (RA), evidence from a male witness regarding the 
complainant’s approach to sexual intercourse was admitted. The evidence was 
tendered to rebut the prosecution’s claim that she was rendered asexual as a result 
of an operation. It is true that this evidence would support an inference that, by 
reason of the sexual nature of the complainant’s conduct, she was less worthy 
of belief. However, it was clearly also tendered to rebut evidence raised by the 
prosecution.
120 Du Toit et al op cit (n43) 24-100F.
121 In S v Mkhize supra (n14), the court strangely conducted an analysis under section 
227 and after ruling out that evidence, proceeded to consider the ‘relevance’ of 
the evidence. The court found that the line of questioning ought not to be allowed 
because it was not relevant, however, if courts are still interpreting relevance as 
requiring a different standard to the factors in section 227(5), the section is not 
properly understood. 
122 See section 2 of this article. 
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to the general admissibility under subsection 5(g). Another reason 
for its relevance may be that the accused genuinely and reasonably 
believed that the complainant had consented. For instance, the parties 
may have had an understanding that a message asking the other to 
come over was always an offer of sexual intercourse. Such evidence 
may be necessary to show that the accused did believe that there was 
consent. However, this is also provided for in subsection 5(e), in that it 
is fundamental to the accused’s defence.
It cannot be upheld that evidence of a past sexual relationship 
between the accused and the complainant is always relevant.123 At 
most, such evidence points only to a propensity to engage in sexual 
intercourse with the accused, which is an inference prohibited by 
subsection 6(a). Furthermore, if evidence of a sexual relationship was 
always admissible, this would have the effect of negatively affecting 
those complainants who are raped by their boyfriends or husbands,124 
because it would always create the assumption that the complainant 
did consent, or that the accused believed that she did consent. The 
former is prohibited, and the latter has to be proven after application 
to admit it is made in terms of subsection (2). Evidence related to a 
past relationship between the parties has no bearing on the truth of 
the allegation before the court at present, unless it can be shown that 
it is relevant according to one of the factors contained in subsection 
(5). Therefore, expecting the accused in such a situation to make 
application to the court before being able to adduce such evidence or 
question the complainant accordingly is not unreasonable.
5 Conclusion
In the recent case of S v Matyityi,125 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
emphasised the importance of adopting a more victim-centred approach 
across the criminal justice system.126 The protection of the complainant 
is a legitimate and important purpose which is foundational to the 
rationale underlying rape shield provisions, and more importantly, the 
rights in the Bill of Rights protect not only accused persons,127 but 
enshrine the right to dignity and privacy of the complainant.
In a South African context, sexual offences are prevalent. Yet, 
reporting rates are extremely low, a fact which can be partly attributed 
123 SJ Wallach ‘Rape shield laws: Protecting the victim at the expense of the defendant’s 
constitutional rights’ (1996–1997) 13 New York L Sch J Hum Rts 485 at 514.
124 It would be a partial reversion to the old approach where ‘marital rape’ was not 
considered rape prior to the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1996.
125 (695/09) [2010] ZASCA 127; 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA).
126 S v Matyityi supra (n125) at para [16].
127 Prinsloo v Bramley Children’s Home [2006] JOL 17236 (T) at 19. 
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to various problems within the criminal justice system, including low 
rates of prosecutions of sexual offences, low conviction rates and 
a general lack of faith in the system.128 Another reason for the low 
rates of reporting is the stigma and humiliation that complainants 
experience throughout the process.
Prior to the enactment of South Africa’s rape shield provision, the 
trauma that the complainant suffered during the trial was disregarded. 
It has now become generally accepted that it is important to offer some 
protection to a complainant even though, in protecting the rights of the 
accused, complete protection cannot be offered to a complainant.129 
The court in the case of De Beer v The State,130 succinctly commented 
on the growing realisation that the myths that are historically bound 
within the law, have to be thwarted:
‘Rape is a topic that abounds with myths and misconceptions. It is a serious 
social problem about which, fortunately, we are at last becoming concerned. 
The increasing attention given to it has raised our national consciousness 
about what is always and foremost an aggressive act. It is a violation that 
is invasive and dehumanising. The consequences for the rape victim are 
severe and permanent. For many rape victims the process of investigation 
and prosecution is almost as traumatic as the rape itself.’131
Rape shield laws aim to prevent evidence that inherently reinforces 
these myths and prejudices from forming part of the evidence that a 
court draws on to reach a decision. The need to prevent, in particular, 
the gendered bias that forms part of our law through a history of 
prejudice cannot be overemphasised.
There is another purpose that underlies the rationale for rape shield 
laws, that of ensuring that only relevant facts are placed before the 
court. In this author’s view, this is the primary need for rape shield 
laws. Generally, evidence of prior sexual history is not directly relevant 
to proving the allegation. Such evidence merely creates assumptions 
and ancillary issues, which detracts from the truth-finding mission of 
the court. The common law of evidence contains the general rules of 
relevance and admissibility. However, due to the history of prejudice 
aimed at rape complainants, these general rules are not successful in 
the area of sexual offences. Section 227 serves the function of creating 
specific guidelines for the issue of prior sexual history evidence, to 
ensure that only sexual history evidence that is genuinely relevant 
will be admitted. This rationale is the most important in showing 
that section 227 does not unjustifiably limit the fair trial rights of the 
128 D Smythe Rape Unresolved: Policing Sexual Offences in South Africa (2015) 213.
129 S v Mothopeng (1) 1979 (2) SA 180 (T).
130 Stephen Bryan de Beer v The State (121/04) (Delivered on 12 November 2004) 
(Unreported judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal).
131 Stephen Bryan de Beer v The State supra (n130) at para [18].
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accused. The rights of the accused do not extend to being allowed 
to raise evidence that is irrelevant and inadmissible. To allow this in 
the context of sexual offences, but not for other offences, would be to 
favour certain groups of accused persons over others depending on 
the type of crime committed, which is illogical and legally incorrect.132
‘It has been said that the victim of a sexual assault is actually assaulted twice 
– once by the offender and once by the criminal justice system.’133
While this article argues that section 227 is an important step in 
changing the level of secondary victimisation experienced by a 
complainant, more work is needed on the use of section 227 in the 
courtroom in order to evaluate its efficacy and true success.
132 Section 9(1) of the Constitution: ‘Everyone is equal before the law and has the right 
to equal protection and benefit of the law.’
133 State v Sheline 955 S.W. 2d 42, 44 (Tenn. 1997).
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